The word "trust" has multiple meanings. 
I. Introduction
The word "trust" has multiple meanings. In everyday speech, it refers to a feeling of confidence associated with integrity, such as trusting that a friend will keep a secret. 1 When passengers board an airplane, they trust that the pilot is qualified and competent. 2 Trust also is the fragile and vulnerable precondition for democracy's existence. 3 Just as wood girds a house, trust girds a society. Thomas Jefferson knew it. 4 Alexander Hamilton knew it. 5 Both men understood trust as foundational to government, although they had different views on who could be trusted to lead. 6 Both would have agreed that trust must flow at a minimal rate from the government to the people and from the people back to the government, as well as among the people. Otherwise, We the People lose confidence in the political and legal structures that are fundamental to society. 7 Although the comparison may surprise at first, trust-in the plain-meaning sense and in a political sense-connects deeply to the legal device known as a trust. Law students, lawyers and lucky individuals understand that a trust is a near-magical device, splitting legal and equitable title between a trustee and a beneficiary. 8 A trustee holds formal legal title to property for the OF 5. Alexander Hamilton imagined a sort of ruling class with greater authority and rights to participate in a democratic government. Hamilton said that communities naturally divided into "the few" and "the many." 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 299 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) (statement of Alexander Hamilton at Constitutional Convention). Hamilton believed that the "few" (whom he called "rich and well-born") would effectively check any improper impulses of the masses. Id. 6. See generally JOHN FERLING, JEFFERSON AND HAMILTON: THE RIVALRY THAT FORGED A NATION xv (2013) ("Politics in the broadest framework is likely to witness continuing divisions over the competing ideas that set Jefferson and Hamilton at odds.").
7. See generally STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANEIL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 77 (2018) ("The erosion of democracy takes place piecemeal, often in baby steps. Each individual step seems minor-none appears to truly threaten democracy. Indeed, government moves to subvert democracy frequently enjoy a veneer of legality."). benefit of a beneficiary, simply because the grantor declares it to be so. 9 The extent to which a society does (or does not) tolerate trusts is a measure of the health of that society's political and legal structures, to a certain extent.
Part II of this Essay employs the metaphor of termites eating away at a building to explain how the erosion of trust can damage any relationship, community or society. Part III argues that a lack of trust in the legal system gave rise to the legal device for preserving or transferring assets known as the trust. Trust law has been relatively stable for centuries, but over the last twenty-five years, major changes to trust law have transformed these tradition-bound vehicles almost beyond recognition. Yet still trusts flourish because of a lack of trust. Part IV explores the function of trusts in contemporary U.S. society, given that certain types of trusts perpetuate wealth inequality. Although trusts that keep rich people rich are the subject of the greatest criticism, Part V of this Essay argues that Louisiana's unusual trust law-which permits human embryos to be held in trust and to have legal standing-presents a greater challenge to the legal system. The effect of the Louisiana law is to push good-faith debate out of venues in which ordinary citizens can participate into the esoteric world of "money law" specialists instead. 10 
II. The Nature of Termites and Trust(s)
Termites can enter buildings from the outside. 11 They make tunnels through the ground, up the concrete foundation and into the wood of the structure. 12 Termites might also enter homes legal and equitable title between the trustee and the beneficiaries).
9. through wood brought from the outside. 13 Thus termites from the outside essentially can "attack" a property that previously was termite-free. 14 Alternately, a structure might be infested with termites from the day it is built, if the wood used in its construction already contains the insects. 15 Termites can lurk in wood for many years and years before their damage becomes visible. 16 After making hundreds, thousands, and millions of little bites-bites imperceptible when made one by one-just a few of these tiny creatures can destroy an entire building. 17 As a thought experiment, consider the capabilities of one termite. A single insect would need over 3,000 years to eat all of the wood in a home of 1,000 square feet in size (the average termite's lifespan is only two years). 18 But because termites live in colonies of millions, and multiple colonies may be found in the same structure, destruction can occur rapidly. By the time the property owner sees physical evidence of termite damage, the structure already may be beyond repair. 19 Using termites as a metaphor, one can gauge the level of trust in any community. Trust within any group of any size-no less between and among the people and political and legal leaders-can erode bite by bite from termites on the inside. It happens in workplaces, where colleagues pass each other in the hallway and do not say hello or make eye contact because of some perceived wrongdoing, whether years in the past or yesterday. That type of behavior is uncivil and eats away at the workplace culture, just as termites eat away at wood. Similarly, trust can erode in families and in personal relationships by forgetting to thank someone for doing an errand, 20 or failing to say, "I'm sorry," 21 when an apology is appropriate. 22 Trust erodes in a social group, when one remains silent in the face of remarks that discriminate against some members. 23 Just as any one termite bite does not cause much damage to a building, any one incident of incivility, hostility, lack of gratitude, or dishonesty will not cause a community to become toxic or make political or legal systems unstable, to be sure. But through accumulated termite bites, the insects will destroy an entire structure, fracture a workplace, family, community, or political and legal systems. 24
III. Trust and Trusts

A. The Origins of Trusts
One need not be a legal historian to understand that trusts were invented to do an end-run around the law. 25 Specifically, in the thirteenth century in England, the Franciscan order prevented its mendicant friars from owning any property. 27 But because the monks needed stable places to live and worship, the Franciscans occasionally identified a wealthy patron who would convey land to a third party to hold the property for the benefit of the friars, who could then use it for their own purposes. 28 Once the use became widely known, wealthy people began employing it to avoid feudal incidents, or a type of tax obligation. 29 Thus, it is fair to say that the history of trusts always-or for at least a very long time-has been intertwined with some type of avoidance. 30 Trusts are legal instruments that meet the needs of those who proclaim, "I don't like or trust the system, so let's figure a way around the rules."
B. Contemporary Trusts
Fast-forward about 900 years-with apologies to the actual legal historians-and trusts are alive and well in the twenty-first century. Trusts in this country hold trillions of dollars worth of assets. 31 At the most basic level, trusts allow rich people to stay rich, because if money is held in a perpetual trust, it need not ever vest in any beneficiary. 32 beyond the tax on the initial transfer in trust-imposed on the movement of wealth from one generation to or for the benefit of another. 33 To be sure, there is a category of trusts that has nothing to do with tax avoidance or doing an "end-run" around that law. 34 Those are trusts for beneficiaries who do not have sufficient capacity to own or manage property themselves. 35 That may be by virtue of being too young-they simply are not old enough to own property 36 -or the beneficiary may be suffering from some sort of neurological difference that makes that person unable to manage assets. 37 These trusts are functional, desirable, efficient alternatives to expensive court-appointed guardianships or custodianships. 38 They allow families to ensure a minimal level of financial resources for loved ones. 39 This Essay brackets those trusts out of the discussion entirely.
In the case of trusts that are designed to keep rich people rich, three very curious things have happened in the United States in the last twenty-five years. These have revolutionized trust law more than anything else in the last 400 years: the rise of self- 36. These so-called "minority trusts" typically provide for property to be held in trust until the beneficiary attains the age of twenty-one (21) settled asset protection trusts, 40 the proliferation of trust decanting rules 41 and the repeal of the rule against perpetuities 42 in over half of the jurisdictions in the nation. 43 Each of these changes is, has been, and will continue to be the subject of study and scrutiny. 44 In order to focus the discussion of trust and trusts, consider the rule against perpetuities. Law professors, law students, and lawyers learn to hate the rule because it is befuddling, confusing, and a minefield for professional errors. 45 Depending on the jurisdiction where they find themselves, some members of the same population then may herald the rule's repeal, rejoicing that they no longer have to teach it, learn it, or risk making a costly professional mistake. 45. Professor Barton Leach famously commented that the rule against perpetuities was "so abstruse that it is misunderstood by a substantial percentage of those who advise the public . . . [and] so capricious that it strikes down in the name of public order gifts which offer no offense except that they are couched in the wrong words." W. In 1997, the Alaska legislature passed a law that provided, in essence, that trusts could last forever. 47 Jonathan Blattmachr, then a partner at Milbank LLP, 48 was one of the principal drafters of the perpetuities repeal legislation in Alaska. 49 Blattmachr's motivation to work on repeal legislation stemmed from a growing awareness that his clients were establishing trusts in foreign jurisdictions to take advantage of laws that permitted self-settled asset protection trusts and perpetual trusts. 50 He thought that a domestic venue would be more reliable; he focused on Alaska because of the relatively small and cohesive bar in that state and because it was less tradition-bound than his home state of New York. 51 Alaska Governor Tony Knowles signed the bill into law on April 1, 1997. 52 After the passage of the Alaska legislation, jurisdictions like Delaware, South Dakota and a variety of other states modernized or radically altered their trust laws. 53 Now, in over half of the jurisdictions in the U.S., an individual can create a trust that lasts forever (or at least for the lifetimes of many more successive generations than any common law perpetuities period would permit). 54 Perpetuities, 66 N.C. L. REV. 545, 545 (1988) (lamenting the rule against perpetuities as "one of the most difficult areas of our law"). § 34.27.051 that permits a 1,000 year period in gross for the exercise or nonexercise of a general power of appointment not presently exercisable because of a condition precedent) and Alaska Stat. § 34.27.100 (retaining limit on suspension of power of alienation to 30 years 
C. Twenty-First Century Trust Law Critiques
Critics of perpetual trusts offer a variety of objections, including that the law encourages all trustees to invest conservatively. 55 Others claim that perpetual trusts create a monied aristocracy that is inconsistent with notions of equal opportunity. 56 Still others frame their opposition in terms of intergenerational equity, saying that each major age cohort should be able to decide for itself whether and how to dispose of trust property. 57 And others point to the lost tax revenue from perpetual trusts. 58 Simply stated, in the case of a trust that lasts forever, if the trust assets never vest in a beneficiary's estate, the assets will not be subject to wealth transfer taxation when they become available to the next generation. 59 Focusing on the law's tolerance of perpetual trusts, it is reasonable to ask who "wins" and who "loses." At the most basic level, the government loses, in the sense that it is unable to collect wealth transfer tax revenue if a trust never terminates. 60 Wealthy people win because they can stay or get wealthier if they do not pay taxes. 61 Beyond the losses to the federal tax coffers and Perpetuities Statutes.
55. See Haskell, supra note 46, at 558-59 (arguing that trustees tend to invest conservatively). This argument has less purchase in light of the enactment of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act that allows the trustee to evaluate trust investments "in the context of the trust portfolio as a whole and as a part of an overall investment strategy having risk and return objectives reasonably suited to the trust." Uniform Prudent Investor Act § 2(b) (Unif. Law Comm'n 1994 
IV. Why Tolerate Trusts?
A. Trusts and Wealth Inequality
Just as termites can slowly and steadily damage a home over a period of years before the harm suddenly becomes visible, 63 the beneficial form of ownership known as a trust has gradually-and now suddenly-morphed nearly beyond recognition through the repeal of the rule against perpetuities, along with the other changes. 64 Traditional trust limitations have been eaten away. Trusts-except ones for minors or disabled beneficiaries 65 -are all based in some sort of desire to work around some law, most often the tax law. 66 Simply put, then, to the extent that trusts enable individuals to minimize or avoid taxation, then trusts certainly play some role in maintaining wealth inequality. 67 more than 2.33% of all federal tax revenue. Wealth inequality in the U.S. is staggering. 68 The gap between the rich and the poor is only getting larger. 69 Trust lawyers should name and own their role in contributing to that inequality. 70 Consider, for example, data from the Congressional Budget Office for the period 1993 to 2013. 71 During that time period, the richest 10% of all families went from holding approximately 30% of all household wealth in this country to holding 76% of all family wealth. 72 The poorest 50% of families did not gain or lose much. 73 Families in between the top 10% to top 15% gained about 9 points. 74 But the big "winners" during this period were families in ("The share of wealth held by families in the top 10 percent of the wealth distribution increased from 67 percent to 76 percent, whereas the share of wealth held by families in the bottom half of the distribution declined from 3 percent to 1 percent.").
the top 10%; they saw their share of wealth multiply two and onehalf times. 75 Wealth inequality must be understood not just in terms of individuals or families generically, but also with respect to race and other identifying characteristics. 76 According to the Institute for Policy Studies, the 400 individuals who comprise the Forbes list of the richest people in America hold as much wealth as all African American households combined with one-third of all Latinx households. 77 To better visualize this disparity, picture 400 people-a group that might fill a medium-sized high school auditorium. 78 It is possible to fill that auditorium with individuals in this country who have as much or more wealth than approximately 23 million people of color. 79 Wealth statistics also break down along other identity lines. 80 There are countless ways to analyze the data. 81 The message is the same: Wealth in this country is concentrated in the hands of the few. 82 
B. Trusts and the American Narrative
Revenue may not be the most important "loss" from legal innovations that impede the taxation of transfers in trust. 83 Wealth transfer taxes represent a tiny percentage of all federal tax revenue. 84 The greater loss related to perpetual trusts, to give just one example, is the expressive value of taxing wealth as it passes from generation to generation or accumulates over time. 85 Because all of these referenced trust innovations are in their relative infancy, it is difficult to predict what the actual impact will be on wealthy individuals' behavior. 86 So any concern is better framed less about what the trusts actually do and more about what they symbolize.
Trusts-and the seeming antidote to them, the estate taxboth have expressive value. 87 The estate tax has a transparent intent: redistribution of wealth. 88 Trusts, especially perpetual trusts, are an easy target. 89 91 More likely, however, the political and legal systems tolerate trusts because of a lesser explored part of that same meritocracy story. If anyone can be anything in the United States 92 -a place lacking a formal nobility, 93 a country where an immigrant can go from rags to riches, 94 and a land that fosters the creative spirit of a college drop-out who builds a multi-million dollar company in his garage 95 -then maybe anyone might become rich through hard work and effort. Just as a significant percentage of the population thinks the estate tax applies to them or their families 96 press-office/2013/01/21/inauguraladdress-president-barack-obama (last updated Jan. 21, 2013) (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) ("We are true to our creed when a little girl born into the bleakest poverty knows that she has the same chance to succeed as anybody else, because she is an American; she is free, and she is equal, not just in the eyes of God but also in our own.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review applies only to those with estates of more than $11.4 million, if single, or $22.8 million if married), 97 a significant percentage of Americans likely think, "I might need a trust one day." Thus, the legal (and practical) tolerance for trusts is entirely consistent with the American mythology that anyone can become anything, including rich and in need of a trust.
Imagine a legal regime in which all of the changes to substantive trust law of the last twenty-five years-perpetual trusts, self-settled asset protection trust and trust decantingdisappeared overnight. It is possible to conceive of a system that allows trusts only for those who are unable to manage money for themselves, because of age or disability. 98 Such changes unlikely would deter wealthy people from finding different ways to reduce their tax bills. 99 If the government closes off one avenue for minimizing taxes, then smart, well-paid lawyers will find other ways to accomplish the same results. 100 That cat-and-mouse game is built into the very structure of the U.S. tax system. 101 Most of the well-known changes to the U.S. trust law in the last twenty-five years do not represent a great threat to democracy. 102 Citizens, lawyers and policy-makers who are committed to a fair and just society instead should turn their attention to a far lesser-known change to the law in the State of Louisiana. This change links more subtly and more profoundly to and object to-the tax).
97. See I.R.C. § 2010 (unified credit against estate tax that essentially "shelters" transfers of these amounts).
98. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text. problems with contemporary political and legal structures in the U.S.
V. Human Embryos in Trust: The Case of Sofia Vergara
Louisiana law treats as legal "persons" human embryos created through artificial reproductive technology. 103 The statute provides that an "in vitro fertilized human ovum exists as a juridical person until such time as the in vitro fertilized ovum is implanted in the womb; or at any other time when rights attach to an unborn child in accordance with law." 104 As a juridical person, the fertilized ovum has the capacity to become a legal party to a lawsuit, for example. 105 Louisiana law specifies that a fertilized human egg is not property, but rather "a biological human being," and if the "donors of the sperm and ovum" choose to "express their identity," then they have all of the rights that parents have under Louisiana law. 106 The standard for adjudicating any disputes over the genetic material is the "best interest of the in vitro fertilized ovum." 107 Curiously, even though Louisiana law defines human eggs fertilized in vitro as "not property," Louisiana law appears to permit these embryos to be transferred to and held in a trust. 108 This treatment is not the result of an affirmative statement in the Louisiana trust law itself, but rather the statutory default rule that unless the governing instrument provides otherwise, a trustee may hold any type of property. 109 In Louisiana, human embryos 103. Although several states have accorded "personhood" status to fetuses, Louisiana appears to be the only state that grants legal personhood to human eggs fertilized by means of assisted reproductive technology. Cf. KAN. STAT. ANN. 105. Id. § 9:124 ("As a juridical person, the in vitro fertilized human ovum shall be given an identification by the medical facility for use within the medical facility which entitles such ovum to sue or be sued.").
106. Id. § 9:126 (ownership of in vitro fertilized ovum). 107. Id. § 9:132. 108. Id. § 9:1737. 109. Conflicting characterization of human bodily materials as "property" or created by artificial reproductive technology are simultaneously "not property" for some purposes and "property" for other purposes. 110 This changing nature of human bodily material as notproperty to property (and vice versa) is not unknown in the law, but usually relates to when a patient has made a decision to part with certain bodily fluid or material for medical research purposes. 111 Whether embryos are "property" for purposes of inheritance and equitable distribution upon divorce are questions that different jurisdictions continue to answer inconsistently. 112 But Louisiana appears to be the only state that explicitly labels as juridical persons human eggs fertilized through artificial reproduction. 113 If those juridical persons can be held in trust, at first glance, the trust would seem to violate the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against slavery. 114 Yet the entrustment of embryos has not been the subject of challenge under Louisiana (or any other) law. 115 Granting legal personhood status to embryos created through artificial reproductive technology represents a creative legal victory by those who believe that life begins at the moment of conception. 116 have the same rights as a child, and the rights of those embryos are superior to the couple's right to have the embryos destroyed, and, by extension, a pregnant woman's right to choose to have an abortion. 117 Many Americans sincerely and deeply hold these views; others do not. 118 All perspectives deserve fair evaluation, taking into account the balancing of rights-and of majoritarian and minority interests-that necessarily must occur in a democracy. 119 But shifting from a macro-political analysis to a more groundeye-view of trusts, consider the ongoing legal dispute between television star Sofia Vergara and her former romantic partner Nick Loeb. 120 When they were engaged to be married, the couple agreed to in vitro fertilization that led to the creation of two viable embryos in November, 2013. 121 The couple decided to freeze the embryos. 122 After the couple broke up in May, 2014, they could not agree about what to do with the embryos, which are stored in a medical facility in California. 123 The legal agreement they entered into prior to the creation of the embryos does not permit either party to use the embryos without the other's consent. 124 In fact, the agreement provides that if the parties cannot agree about the continued "storage, use or disposition" of the embryos, the genetic material is deemed to be "abandoned to the medical facility. After the termination of the parties' romantic relationship, Loeb sought Vergara's permission to have the embryos implanted into a gestational surrogate, but Vergara did not consent. 126 Loeb then brought suit in Los Angeles, California against both Vergara and the medical facility, asserting his parental rights over the embryos. 127 He dropped that lawsuit on December 6, 2016, after Vergara's counsel sought in discovery the names of two former romantic partners of Loeb who had undergone abortions. 128 On December 7, 2016-the day after the California case was dismissed-Loeb filed a petition in the District Court of Louisiana, 24 th Judicial District, Jefferson Parish. 129 Some time during the California proceedings, Loeb had established sufficient contacts with the jurisdiction of Louisiana to be able to avail himself of the state law that grants legal personhood status to embryos created through artificial reproductive technology. 130 He created a trust under Louisiana law on November 30, 2016, and on December 5, 2016, he modified the trust to benefit the embryos, if one or both developed into a live baby, and gave the embryos the names "Emma" and "Isabella." 131 The plaintiffs in Loeb's Louisiana case are denominated as "Human Embryo # 4 HB-A ('Emma')," "Human Embryo #3 HB-A ('Isabella')" and the "Trustee of the Emma and Isabella Trust No. alive. 133 At that time, they will become the sole discretionary beneficiaries of the trust. 134 Loeb's petition states that the embryos have the expectation of an inheritance from Vergara, and Vergara's refusal to allow the embryos to develop into fetuses (and then be born) effectively denies them their inheritance. 135 The case was removed from the 24 th Judicial District, Jefferson Parish, upon petition by Vergara, 136 and the case was assigned to the federal District Court. There, Vergara successfully argued for dismissal of the case on the grounds that she is not subject to general or specific jurisdiction in Louisiana. 137 In January 2018, Loeb brought another suit against Vergara in Louisiana. 138 The case was transferred to federal District Court where Loeb then sued for custody of the embryos under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act and motioned for removal of the case back to state court. 139 Vergara motioned to dismiss the case, arguing that such law does not apply to the embryos and, even if it did, she is not subject to jurisdiction in Louisiana. 140 Loeb opposed Vergara's motion to dismiss in a way that curiously-although obliquely-raises the issue this Essay identifies: There is a contradiction between treating the embryos both as "persons," in the sense of allowing them to sue, and as "property," by allowing them to be held in the very trust Loeb created. 141 Loeb's analogy of embryos to slaves is problematic, historically flawed, and entirely confusing. 143 His comparison of the embryos to Simon Northup is equally puzzling, given it is Loeb himself that created the trust for (or for the benefit of) the embryos. 144 The District Court has remanded the case to the state court. 145 Trusts for embryos are not unique to Louisiana. One Mississippi lawyer markets to clients a "Fertility Preservation Trust," at a cost of $850, to provide "a detailed plan for your embryos now and well into the future." 146 If such a "fertility trust" and the trust created by Loeb in Louisiana are traditional private express trusts, then there persists the inherent contradiction between Louisiana's view that embryos are legal "persons" and allowing persons to be held in trust. 147 It is possible that the word "trust" in the context of embryos is being used euphemistically, with the "trust" being a legal equivalent of a guardianship arrangement, and the trustee is performing the functions that a guardian ad litem would in other jurisdictions. 148 Even so, consider the significance of injecting a trust into legal disputes over genetic material created via assisted reproductive technology when Louisiana law buttresses those disputes by recognizing a fertilized egg as a legal person. 149 Trusts for embryos obscure debates about the legal rights, if any, that should attach from the moment of conception, how those rights conflict with the decision to become a parent or not, and what limits there are to a woman's right to decide what happens with her own body. 150 Trusts obscure and make inaccessible what should be serious discussions about reproductive rights. Trust talk pushes those legal, political, ethical, moral, and even religious conversations further away from venues and language that are accessible to most people. 151 
VI. Conclusion
Once one identifies the fault lines in a political system, the next question is what individuals and communities can do to repair them. To the extent that trusts of property have anti-democratic effects, there is an argument to minimize or discourage their use for wealth transfer purposes or to make them entirely unavailable except in cases of minor or disabled beneficiaries. 153 Certainly, the Louisiana law that permits trusts for embryos shows what lengths that opposing sides will go when they can no longer have civil conversations with each other to achieve legal compromises acceptable to most people. Trusts should not be deployed as weapons in the culture wars.
Lawyers need to be attuned to both trust and trusts in society. Measuring and monitoring both reveal what most needs repairing in the foundation of society. If a community, group or system has been damaged through multiple termite bites, the time is ripe to deploy multiple clusters of metaphorical spiders to restore it. Consider, for example, that approximately one-half of all spiders build webs for the purpose of catching prey. 154 But spider webs also play a role in maintaining social communities 155 and providing physical security to the aphids. 156 
